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We conducted an experiment with 182 inmates from a maximum security prison to analyze the
impact of criminal identity salience on cheating. The results show that inmates cheat more when we
exogenously render their criminal identity more salient. This effect is specific to individuals who have
a criminal identity, because an additional placebo experiment shows that regular citizens do not become
more dishonest in response to crime-related reminders. Moreover, our experimental measure of cheating
correlates with inmates’offences against in-prison regulation. Together, these findings suggest that criminal
identity salience plays a crucial role in rule violating behaviour.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Crime imposes substantial costs on society. For example, it has been estimated that the annual
burden of crime for the United States ranges between one and two trillion US dollars (Anderson,
1999; Ludwig, 2006). Understanding why people commit crime and violate the law is, therefore,
of key interest for policy makers and researchers. According to the seminal work of Becker
(1968), a person’s decision to commit crime is based on weighing the expected material benefits
against the punishment costs.1 A long-standing sociological and psychological literature argues,
however, that in addition to rational cost–benefit calculations, the decision to commit or refrain
from crime also crucially depends on people’s moral and self-image considerations (see Cohen,
1. See Draca and Machin (2015), Chalfin and McCrary (2014), or Nagin (2013) or for excellent reviews of the
empirical literature.
1289
[11:10 9/9/2015 rdv025.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 1290 1289–1308
1290 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
1955; Becker, 1963; Reckless, 1967; Kaplan, 1975; Anderson, 2000).2 These views line up
with recent theoretical approaches in law and economics incorporating identity and norms into
decision making (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; McAdams and Rasmusen, 2007; Posner, 2009;
Bénabou and Tirole, 2011a,b; Acemoglu and Jackson, 2014). For example, people in Akerlof and
Kranton’s model have multiple social identities (e.g. based on gender, ethnicity, or occupation)
that are tied to norms prescribing how one should behave. Identities may influence behaviour
because individuals experience disutility if their behaviour deviates from what their identities
prescribe.
Applying identity theory to the context of crime, we propose that deviant people have a
moral and a criminal identity; these identities differ in the extent to which they impose rule
compliance. Rule violating behaviour inflicts psychological costs on the moral identity (e.g.
Gneezy, 2005; Kartik, 2009; Abeler et al., 2014). Whenever these costs are sufficiently large
relative to the net benefit of rule violation, the moral identity prescribes compliance. In contrast,
the criminal identity does not suffer from moral costs (or suffers to a much lesser extent) and
thus prescribes, in accordance with Becker’s model, breaking rules whenever it pays off. As a
consequence, stronger criminal identification should lead to more rule violating behaviour. While
several correlational studies from criminology indeed report a positive relationship between
survey measures of criminal identity and deviant behaviour (see Gendreau et al., 1996 for a
meta-analysis), these studies are not able to disentangle whether criminal identity has a causal
impact on rule violating behaviour or whether rule violating behaviour leads to stronger criminal
identification.
Identifying the causal influence of criminal identity on rule violating behaviour is challenging.
A simple comparison of criminals and non-criminals is problematic because criminals and law-
abiding citizens may differ in many dimensions that are difficult to control for, such as financial
background, life prospects, or opportunity costs.3 Instead, we experimentally manipulate the
saliency of criminal identity, which circumvents the aforementioned problems involved in the
comparison of people with different levels of criminal identification. Identity theory posits that
the extent to which individuals’ criminal and moral identities guide their behaviour depends
on the relative weight (i.e. salience) they attach to each identity at a given moment (see also
Benjamin et al., 2010, 2015). Consequently, a temporary boost in criminal identity salience
reveals the identity’s marginal behavioural effect.
To test whether criminal identity salience triggers rule violating behaviour, we conducted an
experiment with 182 inmates from the maximum security prison Pöschwies, Switzerland’s largest
penitentiary for male adults. We opted for this unusual subject pool because prison inmates have
plausibly a distinct criminal self-concept due to their extensive histories of criminal misconduct
(e.g. see Walters, 2003 or Lerman, 2009). In our experiment, we randomly increased the saliency
of criminal identity in half of the participants using embedded survey questions that reminded
them of the fact that they are incarcerated criminals (e.g. “What were you convicted of?”). The
other half of the participants served as the control group and answered questions unrelated to
their criminal identity (e.g. “How many hours per week do you watch television on average?”).
The participants subsequently performed a simple coin tossing task, which allows us to measure
their dishonesty as a form of rule violating behaviour. The rules of the task required subjects to
flip 10 coins and report the outcomes on paper. They were allowed to keep every coin for which
they reported “heads”, creating a monetary incentive to break the rules and misreport the coin
2. These theories initiated an active literature in criminology developing psychological scales of criminal self-
concept (e.g. Simourd and Olver, 2002).
3. See Birkeland et al. (2014), Khadjavi and Lange (2013), and Chmura et al. (2013) for studies comparing
distributive preferences and cooperation in criminals and non-criminals.
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flips. Because participants were unobserved, they could easily hide behind chance and thus did
not have to fear any punishment. We are nevertheless able to measure cheating at the group level,
as we know the distribution which should result from honest reporting.4
The results show that a significant share of the inmates cheated. On average, they reported
heads for 60% of the coin flips in the control condition. This is significantly above chance
and approximates 20% of coin flips being misreported.5 However, inmates became even more
dishonest when their criminal identity was rendered more salient. In the criminal identity
treatment, they reported 66% of heads, which corresponds to 32% of coin flips being misreported.
Thus, the higher saliency of criminal identity increased the frequency of misreporting by 60%.
Using administrative data, we further show that behaviour in the coin tossing task correlates with
inmates’offences against in-prison regulation (e.g. aggression against others, use of illegal drugs,
or weapon possession), suggesting that the coin tossing task provides an externally valid measure
of rule violating behaviour. Half a year after the main study, we conducted a further experiment
in the same prison, which serves as a manipulation check. Based on an implicit measure of
criminal cognition, we find that the criminal identity questions enhanced the mental accessibility
of crime-related thoughts. This indicates that the treatment manipulation worked as intended.
We discard several alternative explanations to a criminal identity effect. For example, one
could argue that the questions might have triggered negative emotions and arousal because they
reminded prisoners about their deeds or the social injustice of incarceration (Sherman, 1993).
Such an emotional reaction could potentially undermine honesty. However, we demonstrate that
the criminal identity questions did not influence emotions, and that the correlations between
emotions and cheating are insignificant. Furthermore, the saliency of criminal identity might
have influenced inmates’ risk attitudes (Benjamin et al., 2010). If inmates erroneously believed
that cheating was individually detectable, a decrease in risk aversion could also explain a higher
cheating rate in the criminal identity treatment. We, therefore, elicited inmates’ risk attitudes and
tested whether they are correlated with earnings in the coin tossing task. The correlation is close
to zero and statistically insignificant, suggesting that a change in risk attitudes is unlikely to drive
the priming effect.
Finally, the mere exposure to crime-related content, rather than the salience of criminal
identity, could have triggered dishonest behaviour in the criminal identity treatment. We, therefore,
conducted an additional placebo experiment with “regular” citizens to test whether the priming
effect is specific to people who have a criminal identity. We recruited 193 male citizens from the
general population and administered the same survey. Before answering the six crime-related or
control questions, participants memorized a short text profile describing either a criminal or a non-
criminal person. We created these profiles using representative answers from the prisoners in the
criminal identity, respectively, the control treatment. Subjects subsequently answered the same
questions as the prisoners from the perspective of the person described in the profile. The results
show that the criminal profile treatment had no significant influence on cheating. If anything, the
effect goes in the opposite direction: the fraction of misreported coin flips drops from 14% in
the control condition to 10% in the criminal condition. Together, the three studies suggest that
criminal identity salience promotes rule violating behaviour.
Our results contribute to a growing literature studying the role of identity in economic decision
making (e.g. Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Fang and Loury, 2005; or Bénabou and Tirole, 2011a).
The empirical literature mostly analysed whether people discriminate between in- and outgroup
4. See Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) or Houser et al. (2012) for similar approaches to elicit dishonest
behaviour.
5. In line with previous research on honesty, our subjects did not take full advantage of cheating opportunities
(Ariely, 2012).
[11:10 9/9/2015 rdv025.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 1292 1289–1308
1292 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
members (e.g. Hoff and Pandey, 2006; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Goette et al.,
2012; or Kranton et al., 2013). One of the few exceptions is the study by Benjamin et al. (2010)
who used a similar approach to ours and analysed the influence of ethnic and gender identity
salience on risk and time preferences. A more recent study by Bertrand et al. (forthcoming)
illustrates that gender identity norms influence a wide range of economic and social outcomes.
They find that the norm “wives should not earn more than their husbands” helps explain female
labour force participation, divorce, and the division of home production within U.S. households.6
We add to this literature by providing causal evidence on the impact of identity salience on
dishonest behaviour. In this sense, our results are also relevant for the rapidly expanding literature
on the determinants of dishonesty (e.g. Gneezy, 2005; Mazar et al., 2008; Shalvi et al., 2011;
Balafoutas et al., 2013; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Pruckner and Sausgruber, 2013; or
Cohn et al., 2014).
Our study may also be relevant for the problem of recidivism. Estimates from the U.S.,
for example, indicate that more than 4 out of 10 released inmates are rearrested within three
years (Pew Center on the States, 2011). Our results suggest that one factor that may contribute to
recidivism are the so-called collateral consequences of conviction. These are punishments that
come in addition to the actual sentence and include deprivation of civil rights, loss of professional
licenses, or restricted access to public benefits (Travis, 2002). Besides deterring people, collateral
sanctions may increase the probability of recidivism by reminding convicts of their criminal
identities.
2. AN EXPERIMENT BEHIND BARS
2.1. Design
We conducted our experiment in the maximum security prison Pöschwies—Switzerland’s largest
penitentiary for male adults. A total of 182 inmates participated in the experiment. The majority
of them were convicted of violent crimes (30%), followed by drug related crimes (26%), property
crimes (24%), sex crimes (15%), and other types of crime (5%). Almost two-third (62%) were
repeat offenders. Participants had been incarcerated for 2.7 years on average, with a minimum of
26 days and a maximum of 22.5 years.7
We sent an invitation for a survey study from the University of Zurich to all inmates.
Participants were assured of confidentiality and that their individual data would not be revealed
to the prison authorities. Interested participants could choose their preferred survey language
among four options: German, English, Italian, and French. A few days later, participants received
an envelope containing the survey (see online appendix available as Supplementary Material),
and a second smaller envelope they were instructed to open at a later point in time. We ensured that
the inmates completed the survey in private without being disturbed by guards or other inmates.
Inmates from single cells received the survey overnight, and those who shared their cell with
another inmate completed the survey while their cellmate was working.8 The experiment was
conducted within 24 hours to minimize the possibility of cross-talk among inmates.
The first part of the survey contained filler questions on subjective well-being and standard
demographics. The second part comprised our key experimental manipulation. We randomly
6. See also Alesina et al. (2013) on the historical origins of today’s gender identity norms.
7. See Table A.1 in the Appendix available as Supplementary Material for further descriptive statistics of our
sample. Table A.4 in the appendix available as Supplementary Material shows descriptive statistics from the whole
prison population in the year of the experiment. The composition of participants is very similar to that of the total prison
population.
8. Working hours are staggered for inmates in double cells. Each inmate works for half a day.
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primed half of the participants with their criminal identity by asking them six questions that
reminded them of the fact that they are incarcerated criminals (e.g. “What were you convicted
for?” or “How long have you been in custody?”).9 The other half of the participants served as
the control group and answered six questions unrelated to their criminal identity (e.g. “What
is your favorite activity when you do not have to work?” or “How many hours per week
do you watch television on average?”). These six questions were the only difference between
the criminal identity and the control treatment.10 Immediately after the priming, participants
were asked to indicate their current emotional state using non-verbal Self-Assessment Manikins
(Bradley and Lang, 1994).11 This allows us to identify potential emotional reactions to the priming
questions.
Towards the end of the survey, subjects were instructed to open the second envelope which
contained 10 coins, each worth 0.5 Swiss francs (or 0.55 U.S. dollars). The rules required the
participants to flip the coins sequentially and to report the outcome on paper. They were allowed
to keep every coin for which they reported “heads”. If they flipped “tails”, they had to put the coin
back into the envelope together with the survey, which had to be handed over to the guards on the
next morning. Participants thus had a monetary incentive to cheat by misreporting the outcome
of their coin flips. The stake size was sizeable for the participants, considering that the maximum
payoff matched their hourly wage in prison. Because participants could hide behind chance, it
is impossible to determine with certainty whether an individual cheated or not. They, therefore,
did not have to fear any adverse consequences from cheating. However, we are able to infer the
extent to which participants in different groups cheated by comparing the empirical distributions
of reported heads with the binomial distribution implied by honest behaviour. Moreover, assuming
that none of the participants cheated to his disadvantage—reporting tails when the actual outcome
was heads—we are able to calculate the percentage of coin flips that are misreported (see also
Houser et al., 2012). Let h be the percentage of reported heads and m the percentage of coin
tosses being misreported. The percentage of reported heads is therefore determined by
h=m∗1+(1−m)∗0.5=0.5∗(1+m). (1)
If a participant cheats, he reports heads with probability 1. However, honest reporting implies
that heads occurs only with probability 0.5. We can thus characterize the percentage of coin tosses
that are misreported by
m=2∗h−1. (2)
The last column of Table A.1 in the appendix available as Supplementary Material reports
whether there are any systematic differences between participants in the two treatment conditions
and serves as a randomization check. The background characteristics appear well-balanced across
treatments. There are no significant differences between groups in length of sentences, disciplinary
offences, re-offending status, age, cognitive skills12, risk attitudes, or assignment to prison section.
Only the fraction of inmates in the conviction category “Other” is significantly lower (p<0.05,
χ2 test) in the criminal identity treatment. Treatment differences in the number of years in prison
9. Priming is a method developed in psychology and refers to the activation of mental representations through
situational cues (Shih et al., 1999; LeBoeuf et al., 2010; or Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). Priming is now increasingly
used in economics (e.g. Benjamin et al., 2010, 2015; Chen et al., 2014; Callen et al., 2014; or Hoff and Pandey, 2014).
10. To ensure a ceteris paribus comparison of the two treatments, we also matched the answer formats of the two
sets of questions.
11. These measures have been shown to be consistently correlated with different physiological measures, such as
heart rate and facial muscle contraction (Bradley and Lang, 2000).
12. Cognitive skills were elicited using Frederick’s (2005) cognitive reflection test.
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(p=0.100, rank-sum test) and the share of inmates who completed compulsory school (p=0.095,
χ2 test) are marginally significant. These marginal differences do not occur more frequently than
chance would dictate. We nevertheless control for all three variables in our regression analysis.
2.2. Framework and Hypotheses
We derive our hypotheses by adapting the identity framework from Benjamin et al. (2010). We
assume that inmates have a criminal identity and a moral identity. These identities prescribe
different behaviours in the coin tossing task. As a consequence, an internal conflict arises over
appropriate behaviour. We begin by formalizing the behaviour prescribed by the moral identity.
For the moral self, we assume that the decision to cheat depends on personal benefits
and expected punishment (Becker, 1968), as well as psychological costs of cheating (e.g.
Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Gneezy, 2005; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Mazar et al.,
2008; Kartik, 2009; or Abeler et al., 2014).13 Let xi ∈[0,10] denote the number of heads reported
by inmate i and x0 be his true number of tossed heads. The moral identity’s prescribed action xm
is derived from maximizing the following utility function:
max
xi∈[0,10]
EUi(xi)= (1−p)xi −p[1xi =x0 f −(1−1xi =x0 )xi]−λ(xi −x0)2, (3)
where p is the monitoring probability and f the fine imposed when caught cheating, i.e. xi =
x0. λ denotes the psychological costs of cheating. Given that in our context the probability of
monitoring is zero, i.e. p=0, the decision to cheat reduces to a tradeoff between monetary gains
and psychological costs of cheating. Solving the maximization problem yields the moral identity’s
optimal action xm =x0+ 12λ , which depends on the true outcome x0 and the psychological costs
of cheating λ. The larger the psychological costs, the more xm corresponds to the true outcome
x0.
In contrast to the moral identity, we assume that cheating imposes no psychological costs on
the criminal identity. Consequently, the action prescribed by the criminal identity xc is derived
from maximizing the following utility function:
max
xi∈[0,10]
EUi(xi)= (1−p)xi −p[1xi =x0 f −(1−1xi =x0 )xi]. (4)
Given a monitoring probability of zero, the utility of the criminal identity is maximized if heads is
reported 10 times, i.e. xc =10. Thus, the criminal identity prescribes cheating to the full extent. We
further assume that a criminal person maximizes a utility function that is a convex combination of
the prescribed actions of his criminal identity and moral identity. Deviating from the prescribed
actions causes disutility. A criminal’s maximization problem can thus be characterized as follows:
max
xi∈[0,10]
Ui =−w(s)(xi −xc)2−(1−w(s))(xi −xm)2. (5)
where 0≤w(s)≤1 is the weight placed on the criminal person’s criminal identity, and 1−w(s) is
the relative importance of his moral identity. We assume that w(0)=0 and w′>0. s is the current
strength of the criminal identity and has a permanent component s¯, which may differ between
individuals. Environmental cues or primes can make the criminal identity temporarily salient by
a factor  (i.e. s= s¯∗), where  can take any value between 0 and 1. A value of zero means
13. Note that we use a reduced-form representation of lying costs and do not discriminate between whether these
costs arise from internal (e.g. self-image concerns) or external regulatory processes (e.g. social image concerns).
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that the criminal identity is not at all salient, whereas a value of one means that the criminal
identity is fully salient.14 Inserting the preferred actions xc and xm into equation (5) and solving
the maximization problem gives the following optimal action for inmate i:
x∗i =w(s)∗10+(1−w(s))(x0+
1
2λ
). (6)
The optimal action of a criminal with identity considerations is the weighted average of
the prescribed actions of his criminal identity and moral identity. By inducing an inmate to think
about his criminal background in our experiment, we increase the current strength s of his criminal
identity by a factor  and, therefore, augment the decision weight attached to his criminal identity.
According to equation (6), his optimal action x∗i shifts towards the action the criminal identity
prescribes which is xc =10. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Inmates, on average, report more successful coin flips in the criminal identity
treatment than in the control treatment.
Note that this prediction only applies to individuals who have a criminal identity. If a person
does not have a criminal identity (i.e. s¯=0), crime-related primes do not lead to more cheating
because s= s¯ ·=0. Consequently, our framework predicts that non-criminals will not report
more successful coin flips if they are induced to think about crime. We will return to this point
when we discuss our placebo experiment with regular citizens.
3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We outline our results in four steps. First, we examine the impact of criminal identity salience on
cheating. Secondly, we validate our experimental measure of cheating by showing that behaviour
in the coin tossing task is correlated with inmates’ offences against in-prison regulation. Thirdly,
we analyse data from an additional experiment, which provides a manipulation check for the
identity priming. Finally, we present the result from a placebo experiment conducted with subjects
from the general population and test whether the priming effect is specific to criminals.
3.1. Criminal Identity and Cheating
The results from the coin tossing task show that many of the inmates cheated. On average, they
reported heads for 63% of the coin flips, which is significantly above chance (95% confidence
interval: 60%, 66%15). Assuming that none of the prisoners cheated to his disadvantage—
reporting tails when the actual outcome was heads—we estimate that 26% of the coin flips
were misreported (see equation 2).
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the binomial distribution of the number of heads which should
theoretically result if everyone was honest, and the empirical distribution from the control
treatment. The latter is clearly skewed towards a higher number of heads than honest behaviour
predicts. For example, while we should theoretically expect around 0.1% of the participants
14. Given that our subjects live behind bars their criminal identity may already be salient to some extent in the
control treatment (i.e. >0). On the other hand, it seems also plausible that our subjects distract themselves and do not
think permanently about the fact that they are incarcerated criminals (i.e. <1 in the control group). The more salient
criminal identities are in the control condition, the less likely we will find a treatment effect.
15. The confidence interval is based on individual averages to account for the fact that reporting behaviour could
be correlated within individuals.
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Figure 1
Criminal identity and cheating in inmates. Panel A of this figure shows the distribution of heads reported by the
prisoners in the control treatment and the binomial distribution honest reporting implies. Panel B depicts the distribution
of heads in the criminal identity treatment and the binomial distribution. Panel C compares the average percentage of
heads reported in the control and in the criminal identity treatment. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
to win the maximum amount, almost 13% of the prisoners reported so (p<0.001, Binomial
test). The distribution from the criminal identity treatment is even further shifted towards higher
payoffs (see panel B). The outcome 10, but also the outcomes of 8, 7, and 6 times heads were
significantly more frequent than honest reporting would predict (p’s <0.001, 0.007, 0.059, and
0.097, Binomial tests).
As a result, the average percentage of heads increased significantly from 60% in the control
group to 66% in the criminal identity group (p=0.017, rank-sum test), as shown in panel C.16
The corresponding rates of misreported coin flips are 20%, and 32% respectively, suggesting that
cheating is 60% more frequent in the criminal identity than in the control treatment. Interestingly,
most of the treatment effect comes from incomplete cheaters (i.e. those who report 6, 7, and
8 times heads), arguably those who face a stronger tension between their moral and criminal
identity.
16. All p-values reported in this article are based on two-sided tests except for the Binomial tests, which are based
on directed hypotheses.
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TABLE 1
Regression analysis: criminal identity and cheating
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: heads = 1
Criminal identity 0.061∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
Arousal −0.011
(0.007)
Negative emotions 0.012
(0.007)
Risk attitudes −0.000
(0.006)
Additional controls: no yes yes
Observations 1820 1730 1630
Subjects 182 173 163
Notes: This table reports average marginal effects from a Probit model. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at
the individual level, are displayed in parentheses. In column (1), the decision to report heads is regressed on the criminal
identity treatment dummy. Column (2) additionally controls for the residual category of convictions, the number of years
in prison, and compulsory schooling level, because these variables were imperfectly balanced across treatments. Column
(3) also controls for arousal, negative emotions, and risk attitudes. Due to item non-response, the number of observations
drops when adding covariates. Significance levels: ∗∗ p<0.05.
The regression results shown in Table 1 are in line with the preceding nonparametric analysis.
We estimate a Probit model of the following form:
Pr(headsik =1)=(α+β∗Ci +γ ∗Xi +ik). (7)
The decision of individual i to report heads for coin toss k is regressed on the criminal identity
treatment dummy Ci. We additionally control for the residual category of convictions, the number
of years in prison, and compulsory schooling level in the vector Xi, because these variables were
imperfectly balanced across treatments. ik is the idiosyncratic error term (standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the individual level). (·) is the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution.
The average treatment effect reported in column (1) of Table 1 reveals that the probability
of reporting heads in the criminal identity treatment is 6.1 percentage points higher than in the
control condition (p=0.035). As shown in column (2), the estimate of the treatment effect is even
slightly larger when we include the additional background characteristics as control variables
(p=0.026).17 These findings are summarized in the following result:
Result 1: Prisoners cheat more when their criminal identity is made more salient.
We tested the relevance of alternative interpretations. First, being reminded of one’s criminal
activity or the social injustice of being incarcerated (Sherman, 1993) might have provoked arousal
and negative emotions which may have affected dishonesty. We measured participants’ arousal
and affective state immediately after the priming questions using validated non-verbal Self-
Assessment Manikins (Bradley and Lang, 1994). However, the results show that the saliency of
criminal identity neither had an effect on arousal (p=0.237, rank-sum test) nor on negative affect
(p=0.280, rank-sum test).
Secondly, the criminal identity manipulation might have altered criminals’ risk attitudes
(see Benjamin et al., 2010), and thus possibly also their inclination to cheat. Even though
17. We alternatively estimated a linear probability model using ordinary least squares (OLS) which yielded the
same results.
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it was impossible to detect whether an individual participant cheated, one could argue that
some participants erroneously believed that they might get caught and that this would entail
negative consequences for them. We elicited inmates’ risk attitudes before the priming using an
experimentally validated questionnaire measure of risk attitudes (Dohmen et al., 2011). We found
no significant relationship between individual risk attitudes and behaviour in the coin tossing task
(Spearman’s ρ=−0.017, p=0.820).
Furthermore, we re-estimated model (7) and controlled for arousal, negative affect, and risk
attitudes. Column (3) of Table 1 shows that none of these variables reaches statistical significance
and the coefficient estimate for the criminal identity treatment remains unchanged (p=0.024).
Together, these results suggest that neither emotions nor risk attitudes are able to explain the
treatment effect.
Thirdly, it could be that the prisoners were not completely honest when we asked them about
their offences to appear less of a bad person. This could have spilled over to the coin tossing task
and undermined honest reporting. For example, it may be easier to rationalize dishonest behaviour
if one had just lied. If that were the case, it would not be the saliency of criminal identity,
but a form of moral disengagement that increased cheating in the criminal identity condition.
To test this conjecture, we examined how many prisoners misreported their convictions in the
questionnaire (by comparing self-reports to administrative records). Only 7% of the prisoners’
answers are inconsistent, and an additional 5% of prisoners failed to answer the question. We re-
estimated our main regression model (7) and restricted the sample to inmates who reported their
convictions truthfully. If misreporting in the criminal identity questionnaire induced dishonesty in
the subsequent coin tossing task we should observe a weaker or no priming effect in the restricted
sample. However, the regression results in Table 2 show that the treatment effect remains virtually
the same when we exclude inmates who did not provide truthful responses (columns 1 and 2), or
additionally also exclude inmates who did not answer the question (columns 3 and 4).18
3.2. Validity of the coin tossing task
We present complementary evidence showing that the coin tossing task provides a valid measure
of rule violating behaviour. We were given access to the anonymized administrative records of
disciplinary offences for each participant. Typical offences are aggression against others, drug
or weapon possession, and other kinds of illegal activities. The average inmate had a record of
two disciplinary offences since the beginning of incarceration. We used this information to test
whether behaviour in the coin tossing task correlates with inmates’ institutional behaviour and
estimated the following model using OLS:
yi =α+β∗Hi +γ ∗Ti +δ∗Xi +i. (8)
We regressed the number of offences yi committed by inmate i since incarceration on the
percentage of reported heads Hi in the coin tossing task. We control for the different windows
18. More generally, one could also think of our result as a self-consistency effect, that is, prisoners may want to
behave consistently with their recollection of their previous crimes. Such a self-consistency effect is closely related to
the concept of identity because individuals often define themselves through their past behaviour (Bem, 1972). Hence,
reminding prisoners of their criminal past should make their criminal identity more salient. The idea that individuals
consider their past behaviour to infer their identity is also shared by the recent economic literature on identity. For
example, Bénabou and Tirole (2011a) propose a model where individuals only imperfectly recall their sense of identity
and use past behaviour as a signal of who they are. In a field experiment, Kessler and Milkman (2014) show that reminding
charitable donors of their past donations increases current giving, and that the effect is more pronounced for individuals
who donate on a regular basis. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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TABLE 2
Robustness checks: consistency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: heads = 1
Criminal identity 0.062∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.076∗∗
(0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033)
Additional controls: no yes no yes
Observations 1690 1600 1600 1510
Subjects 169 160 160 151
Sample: conviction is... truthful or not reported truthful
Notes: This table reports average marginal effects from a Probit model. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering
at the individual level, are displayed in parentheses. The decision to report heads is regressed on the criminal identity
treatment dummy. In columns (1) and (2) the sample is restricted to inmates providing truthful (i.e. consistent with
administrative records) or no information concerning their conviction. In columns (3) and (4) we additionally excluded
inmates who did not provide information concerning their conviction from the sample. The additional controls in columns
(2) and (4) are the residual category of convictions, the number of years in prison, and compulsory schooling level, because
these variables were imperfectly balanced across treatments. Due to item non-response, the number of observations drops
when adding covariates. Significance levels: ∗∗p<0.05.
of opportunity using the time each criminal spent in prison Ti as an additional explanatory
variable. We further estimated a model, where we control for a large set of additional criminal
background measures Xi. i is the idiosyncratic error term. Column (1) of Table 3 shows that,
on average, inmates who reported ten times heads committed two more offences in prison
than those who reported heads in 50% of the cases (p=0.034). This difference corresponds
to roughly five additional years of imprisonment (see coefficient estimate for “Years in prison”).
The regression results are robust even when we control for criminal background and socio-
economic characteristics, as shown in columns (2) and (3).19 The following result summarizes
these findings:
Result 2: Behaviour in the coin tossing experiment correlates with rule violating behaviour in
prison.
3.3. Manipulation check
Six months after the main study we conducted a second experiment with 119 inmates from the
same prison using the same procedure. The goal of this follow-up experiment was to measure the
impact of the priming questions on criminal cognition, which serves as a manipulation check.
The first part of the follow-up survey included new filler questions, mostly on subjective
well-being (see online appendix available as Supplementary Material). The second part contained
exactly the same six priming questions as in the previous experiment.20 Following the six priming
questions, participants solved a word stem completion task. For example, they could complete
19. We alternatively treated disciplinary offences as count data and estimated a negative binomial regression model,
which yielded similar results.
20. Sixty-nine inmates had already participated in the first experiment; the other 50 inmates participated for the first
time. Table A.2 in the appendix available as Supplementary Material shows the descriptive statistics of the participants
of the manipulation check. The randomization check in the last column suggests that all background characteristics are
well balanced across treatments. Treatments were randomly assigned for subjects who participated for the first time.
We reversed treatment assignment for subjects who already participated in the main experiment: those who originally
answered the criminal identity questions received the control questions instead, and vice versa. Seven subjects received
the same treatment in the main experiment and the manipulation check by mistake. The results are robust to excluding
these subjects.
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TABLE 3
Prison rule violations and behaviour in the coin tossing task
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: # of disciplinary offences
Percentage of heads 0.040∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.037∗∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Years in prison 0.404∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.109) (0.140)
Criminal background controls:
Type of conviction no yes yes
Repeat offender no yes yes
Prison section no yes yes
Socio-economic controls:
Age no no yes
Nationality no no yes
Education no no yes
Observations 182 182 159
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. In column (1),
the number of disciplinary offences is regressed on the percentage of heads reported and the number of years in prison.
Column (2) includes additional criminal background controls, such as type of conviction, repeat offender status, and
prison section. We do not control for sentence length because it is not determined for more than one-third of the sample
(early imprisonment and safe custody). Column (3) also controls for age, nationality, and education. Significance levels:
∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01.
the word stem “off...” with the crime-related word “offense” or unrelated words such as “office”.
The other two word stems were “acc...” (e.g. accusation versus account) and “pol...” (e.g. police
versus politics).Aresearch assistant who was blind to the experimental conditions categorized the
answers into crime-related and unrelated words. This allows us to compare the mental accessibility
of crime-related constructs across treatments.
As depicted in Figure 2, the mental accessibility of crime-related constructs was effectively
manipulated. In comparison to the control condition, the participants in the criminal
identity treatment mentioned crime-related words almost twice as frequently (p=0.008,
rank-sum test).
Result 3: In comparison with the control treatment, the criminal identity treatment increased the
mental saliency of crime-related constructs, suggesting that the treatment manipulation worked
as intended.
3.4. Placebo experiment with regular citizens
We conducted an additional placebo experiment with subjects from the general population to
further consolidate our results with an effect of criminal identification. An alternative explanation
for the previous findings is that not the salience of criminal identity per se, but rather crime-related
thoughts in general, increased cheating. It is conceivable that exposure to crime-related content
evoked semantically related thoughts and thereby lowered moral standards. This alternative
mechanism would imply that regular citizens react similarly to crime-related priming questions. In
contrast, our identity framework predicts that non-criminal subjects will not react to crime-related
cues because they do not have a criminal identity that can be made more salient (i.e. s¯=0 and
therefore s= s¯∗=0).21
21. See LeBoeuf et al. (2010) for evidence that identity priming only affects behaviour if subjects have the primed
identity.
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Manipulation check. This figure shows the average percentage of crime-related words in the word completion task by
treatment. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
To test this prediction, we recruited 193 male visitors from the resident registration office
of a Swiss municipality.22 We deliberately chose a municipality characterized by a relatively
high proportion of foreigners to recruit participants with a similar cultural background to
that of the prisoners. Moreover, recruitment at the registration office allowed us to approach
representative citizens of the chosen community.23 The experimental design and procedure
followed the prisoners’ experiment as closely as possible. Participants were assured that their
answers would be treated confidentially, and they could choose their preferred survey language
among the same four options. Subjects received an envelope that contained the survey, and
a second smaller envelope with ten 0.5 Swiss franc coins. Participants filled out the survey
alone in an empty room at the resident registration office, ensuring the same degree of privacy
during the experiment. They received an additional fixed show up fee of 10 Swiss francs to
compensate them for their higher opportunity costs of time. The survey was identical to that
administered to the prisoners, except for the treatment manipulation, which needed to be adjusted
slightly. Before answering the crime or control questions, participants had to memorize a short
text profile of a person. They were randomly assigned to a profile of a criminal or a non-
criminal person. We created these profiles using representative answers from the prisoners in
the criminal identity and the control treatment, respectively (see online appendix available as
Supplementary Material). Subjects subsequently answered the same six priming questions as
the prisoners but from the perspective of the person described in the profile. After the quiz,
participants were asked to open the second envelope and to complete the coin tossing task. At
the end of the experiment, participants returned the sealed envelopes by putting them into a box
placed in the corner of the room. Table A.3 in the appendix available as Supplementary Material
22. We cannot rule out that some of our subjects might have committed crimes because we do not know their
criminal histories. However, if some of the subjects were indeed criminals, their presence would work against our
prediction, making the test even stronger.
23. Citizens mostly visit the registration office to receive or renew official documents, such as passports and
residency permits.
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Crime-related reminders and cheating in regular citizens. Panel A of this figure shows the distribution of heads reported
by the non-criminal population in the control treatment and the binomial distribution implied by honest reporting. Panel
B depicts the distribution of heads in the criminal profile treatment and the binomial distribution. Panel C compares the
average percentage of heads reported in the control and criminal profile treatment. Error bars indicate standard error of
the mean.
presents descriptive statistics and the randomization check for the placebo experiment. There are
no significant differences between treatments for any of the elicited background characteristics,
with the exception of vocation schooling (p=0.043,χ2 test), suggesting that the randomization
was successful.
The results show that the general population reported, on average, 56% of heads in the coin
tossing task (95% confidence interval: 53%, 59%). This corresponds to 12% misreporting. Thus,
participants from the general population cheated too, but to a lesser extent than the criminals
(p=0.004, rank-sum test). A clear difference between the sample of criminals and the non-
criminal population is the occurrence of the payoff maximizing outcome. While the criminals in
the control treatment reported 10 times heads in 13% of cases, the same outcome is observed
only in 4% of cases in the control group of the non-criminal population (p=0.031, χ2 test).
However, these differences should be interpreted cautiously, because they could also be attributed
to unobserved factors which differ between the two social groups. The relevant question is whether
the treatment influenced cheating within the general population.
[11:10 9/9/2015 rdv025.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 1303 1289–1308
COHN ET AL. CRIMINAL IDENTITY SALIENCE AND RULE VIOLATION 1303
Panel A of Figure 3 contrasts the binomial distribution of heads with the empirical distribution
observed in the control group of the general population. The distribution is shifted to the right,
suggesting that individuals over-reported the number of heads. In contrast to the experiment with
the prisoners, the distribution from the criminal profile treatment is very similar to that in the
control treatment, as shown in panel B. Panel C highlights that the average percentage of heads
is even slightly lower in the criminal profile (55% heads or 10% misreporting) compared to the
control treatment (57% of heads or 14% misreporting), but not significantly so (p=0.240, rank-
sum test). Thus, if anything, the general population tended to cheat less when primed with the
criminal profile rather than the control profile. Overall, the results from the placebo experiment
suggest that the priming effect is specific to criminals and is thus consistent with a criminal
identity effect. This is summarized in the final result:
Result 4: Regular citizens do not cheat more when crime-related concepts are rendered more
salient.
Note that this result is consistent with the self-concept maintenance theory proposed by
Mazar et al. (2008). According to their framework, a moral prime renders non-criminal subjects
more honest because it reminds them of their own moral standards. Our prime, however, was
based on the immoral behaviour of a third person. One could even argue that when subjects
are asked to think about the crimes of another person, their moral self-image is threatened and
they, therefore, engage in counteractive behaviour (see Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006). This might
explain why subjects in the criminal profile condition tended to be more honest than those in the
control condition.
4. CONCLUSION
We study the impact of criminal identity salience on rule violating behaviour in 182 inmates
from a maximum security prison. We experimentally manipulated the saliency of their criminal
identity and subsequently measured their dishonesty in an incentivized coin tossing task. Our
results show that prisoners cheated substantially more when their criminal identity was rendered
more salient. This effect is specific to individuals with a criminal identity, as we did not find any
influence of crime-related reminders in a placebo experiment with regular citizens. Furthermore,
we show that our experimental measure of dishonesty correlates with inmates’ disciplinary
offences. Together, these findings suggest that criminal identity salience plays a crucial role
in rule violating behaviour and also support recent theoretical endeavours incorporating identity
into economic models of decision making (e.g. Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Fang and Loury,
2005; and Bénabou and Tirole, 2011a).
It may seem surprising that we were able to increase the saliency of criminal identity of
maximum security prisoners given that they are locked in an environment, which constantly
reminds them of their criminal identities. However, our results from both the coin tossing task
and the manipulation check suggest that everyday prison life does not necessarily render inmates’
criminal identities maximally salient at all times. Inmates are probably able to distract themselves,
and therefore habituate to the permanent cues in their environment.
From a policy perspective, our results raise the possibility that legal sanctions can have
side effects with unintended consequences. Convictions often come along with collateral
consequences, such as deprivations of civil rights, loss of professional licenses, or restricted
access to public benefits (Travis, 2002). The intended deterrent effects of these consequences may
come at the cost of reminding convicts of their criminal identity, which may increase their risk
for relapse. As discussed above, however, permanent reminders are potentially less problematic
than intermittent or novel cues. Identifying the extent to which the saliency of criminal identity
[11:10 9/9/2015 rdv025.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 1304 1289–1308
1304 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
counteracts the deterrent effects of collateral consequences is, therefore, an important avenue for
future research.
APPENDIX
A. Additional tables
TABLE A.1
Descriptive statistics of the main experiment
Total sample Criminal identity Control
N =182 N =90 N =92
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd p-value
Type of conviction:
Violent crimes 0.297 (0.458) 0.256 (0.439) 0.337 (0.475) 0.229
Drug-related crimes 0.264 (0.442) 0.278 (0.450) 0.250 (0.435) 0.671
Property crimes 0.242 (0.429) 0.267 (0.445) 0.217 (0.415) 0.438
Sex crimes 0.148 (0.356) 0.189 (0.394) 0.109 (0.313) 0.128
Other 0.049 (0.217) 0.011 (0.105) 0.087 (0.283) 0.018
Repeat offender 0.621 (0.487) 0.567 (0.498) 0.674 (0.471) 0.136
Sentences:
Sentence length (if known) 4.574 (4.364) 5.082 (4.580) 4.065 (4.114) 0.167
Safe custody 0.176 (0.382) 0.178 (0.384) 0.174 (0.381) 0.945
Early imprisonment 0.176 (0.382) 0.167 (0.375) 0.185 (0.390) 0.748
Years in prison 2.659 (3.922) 3.055 (4.433) 2.272 (3.326) 0.100
Prison section:
Double cell 0.352 (0.479) 0.367 (0.485) 0.337 (0.475) 0.675
Single cell (normal) 0.368 (0.484) 0.356 (0.481) 0.380 (0.488) 0.728
Single cell (special) 0.280 (0.450) 0.278 (0.450) 0.283 (0.453) 0.942
No. of disciplinary offences 2.187 (4.371) 2.533 (4.432) 1.848 (4.307) 0.131
Nationality:
Swiss 0.322 (0.468) 0.369 (0.485) 0.276 (0.450) 0.192
South-eastern European 0.298 (0.459) 0.262 (0.442) 0.333 (0.474) 0.307
African 0.146 (0.354) 0.143 (0.352) 0.149 (0.359) 0.903
Central European 0.123 (0.329) 0.107 (0.311) 0.138 (0.347) 0.540
Other 0.111 (0.315) 0.119 (0.326) 0.103 (0.306) 0.746
Age 38.341 (11.306) 39.246 (12.059) 37.497 (10.553) 0.479
Highest completed education:
Compulsory school 0.376 (0.486) 0.437 (0.499) 0.314 (0.467) 0.095
Vocational school 0.347 (0.477) 0.345 (0.478) 0.349 (0.479) 0.956
High school 0.087 (0.282) 0.057 (0.234) 0.116 (0.322) 0.169
Teaching diploma 0.023 (0.151) 0.011 (0.107) 0.035 (0.185) 0.306
Adv. vocational school 0.104 (0.306) 0.115 (0.321) 0.093 (0.292) 0.637
Univ. of applied sciences 0.035 (0.184) 0.023 (0.151) 0.047 (0.212) 0.398
University 0.029 (0.168) 0.011 (0.107) 0.047 (0.212) 0.169
Risk attitudes 5.392 (3.036) 5.163 (2.854) 5.626 (3.212) 0.294
Cognitive skills 0.676 (0.974) 0.778 (1.036) 0.576 (0.905) 0.152
Survey language:
German 0.709 (0.456) 0.722 (0.450) 0.696 (0.463) 0.693
English 0.126 (0.333) 0.111 (0.316) 0.141 (0.350) 0.540
Italian 0.099 (0.299) 0.089 (0.286) 0.109 (0.313) 0.655
French 0.066 (0.249) 0.078 (0.269) 0.054 (0.228) 0.524
Notes: All variables are binary, except for sentence length (in years), years in prison, number of disciplinary offences,
age (in years), risk attitudes (from 0 “not at all willing to take risks” to 10 “fully willing to take risks”), and cognitive
skills (score in the cognitive reflection test ranging from 0 to 3). “Single cell (normal)” and “Single cell (special)” means
single cell in normal, respectively, special correction facility. Sentence length is known for 118 subjects. Due to item non-
response, 11 observations are missing for nationality, 8 for age, 9 for education, and 6 for risk attitudes. The last column
presents p-values for the null hypothesis of perfect randomization (χ2 tests in case of binary variables and rank-sum tests
in case of interval variables).
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TABLE A.2
Descriptive statistics of the manipulation check
Total sample Criminal identity Control
N =119 N =52 N =67
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd p-value
Type of conviction:
Violent crimes 0.319 (0.468) 0.346 (0.480) 0.299 (0.461) 0.580
Drug-related crimes 0.269 (0.445) 0.327 (0.474) 0.224 (0.420) 0.209
Property crimes 0.218 (0.415) 0.192 (0.398) 0.239 (0.430) 0.543
Sex crimes 0.151 (0.360) 0.096 (0.298) 0.194 (0.398) 0.139
Other 0.042 (0.201) 0.038 (0.194) 0.045 (0.208) 0.865
Repeat offender 0.538 (0.501) 0.519 (0.505) 0.552 (0.501) 0.720
Sentences:
Sentence length (if known) 5.649 (4.260) 4.674 (3.295) 6.327 (4.746) 0.131
Safe custody 0.218 (0.415) 0.250 (0.437) 0.194 (0.398) 0.464
Early imprisonment 0.269 (0.445) 0.269 (0.448) 0.269 (0.447) 0.994
Years in prison 2.522 (4.005) 2.246 (3.787) 2.736 (4.181) 0.183
Prison section:
Double cell 0.303 (0.461) 0.308 (0.466) 0.299 (0.461) 0.914
Single cell (normal) 0.319 (0.468) 0.250 (0.437) 0.373 (0.487) 0.153
Single cell (special) 0.378 (0.487) 0.442 (0.502) 0.328 (0.473) 0.204
No. of disciplinary offences 2.571 (5.148) 2.442 (5.707) 2.672 (4.711) 0.226
Survey language:
German 0.840 (0.368) 0.808 (0.398) 0.866 (0.344) 0.392
English 0.084 (0.279) 0.096 (0.298) 0.075 (0.265) 0.675
Italian 0.050 (0.220) 0.077 (0.269) 0.030 (0.171) 0.244
French 0.025 (0.157) 0.019 (0.139) 0.030 (0.171) 0.714
Notes: All variables are binary, except for sentence length (in years), years in prison, and number of disciplinary
offences. “Single cell (normal)” and “Single cell (special)” means single cell in normal, respectively special correction
facility. Sentence length is known for 61 subjects. The last column presents p-values for the null hypothesis of perfect
randomization (χ2 tests in case of binary variables and rank-sum tests in case of interval variables).
TABLE A.3
Descriptive statistics of the placebo experiment
Total sample Criminal identity Control
N =193 N =98 N =95
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd p-value
Nationality:
Swiss 0.587 (0.494) 0.573 (0.497) 0.602 (0.492) 0.683
South-eastern European 0.106 (0.308) 0.083 (0.278) 0.129 (0.337) 0.307
African 0.011 (0.103) 0.010 (0.102) 0.011 (0.104) 0.982
Central European 0.243 (0.430) 0.271 (0.447) 0.215 (0.413) 0.372
Other 0.053 (0.224) 0.063 (0.243) 0.043 (0.204) 0.550
Age 41.605 (17.155) 42.930 (18.236) 40.251 (15.963) 0.424
Highest completed education:
Compulsory school 0.095 (0.294) 0.126 (0.334) 0.064 (0.246) 0.143
Vocational school 0.365 (0.483) 0.295 (0.458) 0.436 (0.499) 0.043
High school 0.106 (0.308) 0.137 (0.346) 0.074 (0.264) 0.163
Teaching diploma 0.037 (0.189) 0.021 (0.144) 0.053 (0.226) 0.242
Adv. vocational school 0.175 (0.381) 0.158 (0.367) 0.191 (0.396) 0.543
Univ. of applied sciences 0.095 (0.294) 0.116 (0.322) 0.074 (0.264) 0.333
University 0.127 (0.334) 0.147 (0.356) 0.106 (0.310) 0.397
Risk attitudes 5.940 (2.423) 5.724 (2.503) 6.165 (2.330) 0.259
Cognitive skills 1.228 (1.186) 1.245 (1.149) 1.211 (1.228) 0.722
Continued
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TABLE A.3
Continued
Total sample Criminal identity Control
N =193 N =98 N =95
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd p-value
Survey language:
German 0.938 (0.242) 0.929 (0.259) 0.947 (0.224) 0.589
English 0.041 (0.200) 0.041 (0.199) 0.042 (0.202) 0.964
Italian 0.005 (0.072) 0.010 (0.101) 0.000 (0.000) 0.324
French 0.016 (0.124) 0.020 (0.142) 0.011 (0.103) 0.579
Notes: All variables are binary, except for age (in years), risk attitudes (from 0 “not at all willing to take risks” to 10
“fully willing to take risks”), and cognitive skills (score in the cognitive reflection test ranging from 0 to 3). Due to item
non-response, 4 observations are missing for nationality and education, 11 for age, 1 for risk attitudes. The last column
presents p-values for the null hypothesis of perfect randomization (χ2 tests in case of binary variables and rank-sum tests
in case of interval variables).
TABLE A.4
Descriptive statistics of total prison population based on the annual report
Variable Total (N =422) in %
Nationality:
Swiss 111 26
South-eastern European 120 28
African 72 17
Central European 45 11
Other 74 18
Age (years):
29 or younger 122 29
30–39 126 30
40–49 97 23
50–59 62 15
60 or older 15 4
Sentence length (if known):
less than 6 months 19 5
6–12 months 3 1
1–2 years 8 2
2–3 years 37 9
3–5 years 69 16
5–10 years 87 21
10–20 years 43 10
more than 20 years 4 1
Safe custody 82 19
Early imprisonment 70 17
Type of conviction:
Violent crimes 121 29
Drug-related crimes 118 28
Property crimes 79 19
Sex crimes 56 13
Other 48 11
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